University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2021

Reversing the Fortunes of Active Funds
Adi Libson
Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law

Gideon Parchomovsky
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Accounting Commons, Accounting Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons,
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Law and Economics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Securities Law
Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Repository Citation
Libson, Adi and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Reversing the Fortunes of Active Funds" (2021). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 2131.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2131

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

LIBSON.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/22/21 4:17 PM

Reversing the Fortunes of Active Funds
Adi Libson* and Gideon Parchomovsky**
In 2019, for the first time in the history of U.S. capital markets, passive
funds surpassed active funds in terms of total assets under management. The
continuous growth of passive funds at the expense of active funds is a genuine
cause for concern. Active funds monitor the management and partake of
decision-making in their portfolio companies. Furthermore, they improve price
efficiency and managerial performance by engaging in informed trading. The
buy/sell decisions of active funds provide other market participants reliable
information about the quality of firms. The cost of active investing is significant
and it is exclusively borne by active funds; the benefits, by contrast, are spread
over all shareholders, including passive funds that freeride on the efforts of their
active peers. Therefore, the contraction of active funds threatens to set back the
quality of corporate governance in U.S. firms.
This Essay proposes a way to reverse this trend. To preserve the benefits
presented by active funds, we explore the possibility of employing tax
mechanisms to help defray the extra cost borne by active funds. Perversely, at
present, our tax laws exacerbate the problem. Since active funds trade more
frequently than passive ones, they face a substantially heavier tax burden. We
argue that taxation is the key to leveling the playing field in capital markets.
Specifically, we establish a prima facie case for using tax credits to support
active funds and enhance their market share. We focus on two types of tax
credits: effort-based tax credits and result-based tax credits. Effort-based tax
credits would be granted whenever an active fund undertakes prespecified
measures to improve corporate governance irrespective of their success. Resultbased tax credits would be contingent on the attainment of certain outcomes. The
two types are not mutually exclusive and, as we will show, can be combined for
maximal effect.
Our proposal has three potential advantages over competing initiatives that
seek to induce passive funds to become more active. First, taxes constitute a
highly effective tool for altering behavior as they transform the underlying
motivations of the subject. Second, our proposal has the potential to create a
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virtuous financial cycle: the expected increase in tax revenues from the improved
performance of firms generated by the tax credit should cover the cost of
providing the credits. Third, and finally, from a political economy standpoint,
our proposal, on account of its noncoercive nature, will not attract opposition
from the investment industry and thus stands a realistic chance of being adopted.
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Introduction
Passive funds are on the rise. Between 2008 and 2015, investments in
active funds shrunk by $800 billion, while investment in passive funds
increased by $1 trillion.1 This trend has intensified in recent years. In 2017
alone, passive mutual funds absorbed $692 billion, in contrast to the outflows

1. Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk,
19 BUS. & POL. 298, 299 (2017).
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from active funds that reached $45 billion.2 This process has culminated in a
transformative moment: in September 2019, for the first time in the history
of U.S. capital markets, the assets held by passive funds surpassed those of
active funds.3
This development in the structure of the capital market has far-reaching
implications for corporate governance. The investments of most passive
funds are pegged to a certain index.4 They invest in the companies that
comprise the index, independent of the quality of decision-making in those
companies. The strict focus of passive funds on lowering fees to investors
prevents them from allocating resources to monitoring and analysis of firms.
A fortiori, participation in informed decision-making in the form of active
engagements is antithetical to the investment strategy of passive funds.
Active funds follow a very different investment strategy. They analyze
the performance of companies on an ongoing basis, and thus engage in
informed trading decisions, monitor the management of the companies in
which they invest, and play an active role in strategic decision-making in
those companies.5 Through these measures, active funds improve managerial
performance not only in their portfolio companies, but also in the market at
large. Due to their active investment strategy, the fees charged by active
funds are much higher than those charged by passive funds. At the same time,
because the benefits produced by active funds inure to all investors, active
funds capture only a small portion of the value they produce.6 The
2. Dani Burger, Investing in Index Funds Is No Longer Passive, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28,
2018, 2:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-27/passive-becomes-thenew-active-as-indexing-rules-everything [https://perma.cc/44NE-GTZP].
3. John Gittelsohn, End of Era: Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active in Epic Shift, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 11, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-11/passive-u-sequity-funds-eclipse-active-in-epic-industry-shift [https://perma.cc/5ZCY-SSZ7].
4. Regarding the definition of an index and examples of passive investment strategy, see
Andrew W. Lo, What Is an Index?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 2016, at 21, 21–22.
5. These two functions—active trading and involvement in managerial decisions—are linked
together to a certain extent. The ability of active funds to buy and sell shares and alter their portfolios
provides them with leverage over managers and boards. See Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley &
Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 113 (2016)
(“[P]assive investors might be less able to exert influence over managers. By seeking to minimize
deviations from the underlying index weights, passive institutions tend to lack a traditional lever
used by non-passive investors to influence managers—the ability to accumulate or exit positions.”).
Regarding how the possibility of exit may be required for the efficacy of voice mechanisms, see
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 35–36 (1970).
6. This is what separates active funds from activist hedge funds. The engagements of activist
hedge funds are far more aggressive and far-reaching than those of active funds. Critically, though,
activist hedge funds capture the lion’s share of the benefits they produce. It should be added that
there exists a heated debate in the corporate law scholarship about whether activist hedge funds
produce any benefits at all. Several scholars have pointed out that the shares of companies targeted
by activist hedge funds tend to go up in the short run, but often fall in the long run. The engagements
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combination of higher fees and insufficiently high yields to offset them has
caused many investors to switch from investing in active funds to passive
funds. Yet from the societal perspective, the decline in active funds is
alarming because of their important market-wide effects.
The continuous contraction of active funds with its attendant negative
consequences for corporate governance has not escaped the attention of
corporate scholars who have suggested various ways to empower active
funds.7 Existing proposals, while varied and nuanced, share a common
ground: they all seek to enhance the market position of active funds by
introducing changes in corporate law. These proposals run the gamut from
mandating participation in corporate decision-making to requiring a certain
level of expenditures on active engagements to introducing dual class shares
to tilt the balance in favor of active funds.8 Conspicuous in its absence is a
tax-based mechanism.
The absence of a tax-based solution is a puzzle because active funds
engender significant positive externalities in financial markets and the classic
response to their existence is predicated on tax instruments. The engagements
of active funds through voice (i.e., actual participation) and exit (i.e., sale of
shares based on firm-specific knowledge) generate unaccounted-for
benefits—known as positive externalities—for individual shareholders,
passive funds, and most importantly, society at large.9 The involvement of
active funds with firm managements, as well as their trading decisions,
enhance the value of the target firm and transmit important information to the
market. Furthermore, improved corporate governance in one company has
of activist hedge funds primarily focus on cutting costs. While this strategy yields short-term
positive effects, it often harms companies in the long run. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Erasmo
Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value 21,
23, 41–42 (Dec. 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231
(challenging the view that hedge fund activism adds long-term value through a finding that, despite
positive initial returns, the value of activist hedge fund targets tend to be lower than the value of
control firms in the long run).
7. It should be noted that not all scholars agree that the decline of active funds is a cause for
concern. See Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 35 (2019) (arguing that
competition from passive funds will cause active funds to improve their performance); Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J.
445, 480 (1991) (noting the limited incentives of mutual funds and other institutional investors);
Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be
Shareholders 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 18-39, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 (arguing that passive funds have a sufficient
incentive to engage in monitoring the companies in their portfolio).
8. For a discussion of existing proposals, see infra subpart III(A).
9. For a very recent discussion regarding the positive externalities of active funds and the
problem that the growing market share of passive funds poses for the market at large, see
Jonathan Guthrie, The Fallacy Behind the Rise of Passive Fund Management, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1c4382c6-36cb-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 [https://perma.cc
/FV9D-KV8R].
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the potential to lift other companies in the same sector by establishing better
governance standards for the entire industry. Gains by public companies, in
turn, translate into greater tax revenues for society at large, including
individuals who do not invest in the stock market. Hence, the decline of active
funds has adverse effects that go well beyond the capital market.
Positive externalities cannot be taken for granted. Economic theory
teaches that in the absence of government incentives, behavior that generates
a positive externality will be undersupplied relative to the optimal social
amount because the actor bears the full marginal cost of the relevant activity,
but appropriates only a fraction of the marginal benefit.10 For this reason,
Arthur Cecil Pigou has famously argued for the use of taxes and subsidies to
address the challenge of externalities (both positive and negative).11 Taxes
should be used to lower the level of activities that produce adverse social
effects (negative externalities); subsidies should be employed to encourage
behavior that produces desirable social effects (positive externalities). Yet,
the existing tax regime only exacerbates the plight of active funds.
Perversely, passive funds enjoy a more lenient effective tax burden than
active funds.12 The turnover ratio of active funds is over 300% higher than
that of passive funds.13 As a consequence, active funds are taxed more
frequently and their effective tax rate is higher by nearly 40%, relative to
passive funds.14
While uneven taxation is presently part of the problem, it can be the
solution to the problem of active funds. In this Essay, we explore the option
of using favorable tax treatment to incentivize sophisticated investors to
assume an active role in corporate governance.15 We examine how targeted
tax benefits, in the form of tax credits, can enhance the attractiveness of active
funds relative to passive ones. Tax credits may be keyed to efforts or

10. See, e.g., Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 42 J.L. & ECON. 141, 141–42 (1979)
(explaining that some beneficial transactions are not carried out by wealth-maximizing agents
because the cost of the transaction is greater than the actual benefit).
11. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 381 (4th ed. 1932).
12. See infra note 108; see also infra note 107.
13. See infra note 105.
14. On average, active funds pay annually nearly 40% more tax as a percentage of their returns
than passive funds: 0.96% of their returns compared to 0.69% paid by passive funds. See infra note
107 and accompanying text.
15. It is possible to internalize positive externalities, by both taxing and spending mechanisms.
The main considerations for which of the two should be chosen are a matter of institutional and
organizational design. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 957 (2004) (arguing that the decision to integrate tax and
spending programs through the tax system “is solely a matter of institutional design”). The
organizational consideration they raise—the complexity of having an additional system to which
firms would have to release their information—leads to preferring the tax system over an additional
spending program. See id. at 995 (explaining that separate systems lead to more complexity through
specialization, which would require more precision and detailed measurements in each system).
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outcomes. Effort-based tax credits can be used to reward institutional
investors that incur specific expenses associated with corporate activism—
for example, an engagement in a proxy contest or corporate governance
analysis—irrespective of the ultimate result. A result-based tax credit would
be awarded to successful activists whose efforts bear fruit. The credit amount
would be determined based on a menu of milestones that reflect inner-firm
changes, such as an appointment of a director or a restructuring of
management compensation. Alternatively, the credit can be pegged to the
performance of a company’s stock.16 Since effort-based tax benefits and
result-based tax benefits are not mutually exclusive, the two can be
combined. For instance, it is possible to provide modest effort-based tax
benefits to active investors in order to spur them to launch initiatives and
explore opportunities to get involved in specific corporations and then
supplement them with result-based benefits if a desirable outcome is
ultimately attained. The deployment of the credit can be designed in a way
that does not adversely affect the public at large. The tax reductions to active
funds would be financed by increasing the rates of non-active market
participants that benefit from the actions of active funds.
Our proposal offers three potential advantages over competing
mechanisms aimed at bolstering engagements by shareholders. First, tax
incentives constitute a far more effective tool for encouraging the growth of
active funds and active participation in corporate matters than legislation or
regulation that forces passive funds to become active. If a passive fund has
no interest in assuming an active role in the management of a company, it is
highly doubtful that legal mandates forcing engagement would achieve their
desired goal of meaningful engagements. Worse yet, mandatory measures
would necessitate significant expenditures on monitoring and enforcement.
Tax benefits, by contrast, allow each category of funds, active and passive,
to act as it prefers, while maintaining a stable market equilibrium between
the two groups. Furthermore, tax instruments are flexible and dynamic.
Unlike binary regulatory mechanisms, a tax benefit can be keyed to multiple
performance indicators and can be adjusted to fit the changing magnitude of
the positive externalities generated by sophisticated investors.17
Second, implementation of our proposal is likely to have a budgetneutral effect. As we noted, active funds generate much higher tax revenues

16. For a detailed discussion, see infra section II(B)(2).
17. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7–10 (2002) (emphasizing that the price element of taxes
provides the government with vital information that can be utilized to optimize the tax instrument).
The price element of taxes can also serve as a mechanism for revealing information to the parties.
See, e.g., Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEXAS L.
REV. 837, 848 (2014) (explaining that prices reveal information about the subjective valuations of
parties).
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than passive funds. Taxes are paid only in the event of realization of
investments. Realization events are much more frequent in active funds that
engage in constant trading. Recall that passive funds mostly rely on a buy
and hold strategy and, as a consequence, trade less frequently. Owing to the
different trading strategies of passive and active funds, the award of a tax
credit to active funds will partially pay itself off. Moreover, the involvement
of active funds in corporate governance has the potential to increase the
aggregate profits of firms, and, as a result, enhance the tax base. Therefore,
the provision of tax credits would not a fortiori adversely affect tax
collection.
Third, and finally, our proposal stands a much better chance of being
adopted relative to all other proposals as it employs a “carrot” in the form of
a tax benefit to achieve the desired result.18 As a vast literature in economics
and political science demonstrates, industries are much more likely to support
policy proposals that rely on carrots, rather than sticks. This is especially true
for the politically potent investment industry. Since our proposal encourages
positive behavior (active investment), rather than penalizing the mirrorimage behavior (passive investment), it stands a much higher chance of being
adopted, relative to the alternatives.
The remainder of this Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I will discuss the
positive externalities generated by active institutional investors and how they
improve corporate governance structures. Part II will present a specific policy
proposal detailing how tax incentives can be employed to promote investors’
engagement in corporate governance. Part III enumerates the advantages of
our proposal, relative to preexisting ones. A short conclusion will ensue.
I.

Positive Externalities of Active Funds
Institutional investors have come to dominate financial markets.
Bernard Black was one of the first scholars to identify the rise of institutional
investors as a game-changing factor for the agency problem that arises from
rational apathy.19 This phenomenon has been thoroughly analyzed by Jeff
18. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 803–06 (2012) (defining carrots and sticks).
19. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811, 813 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520, 575–91 (1990). Other scholars, such as Ronald Gilson, Reinier Kraakman, and Roberta
Romano, have supported this view. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 866 (1991) (noting
the rapid growth of funds managed by institutional investors and related monitoring problems);
Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate
Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (1989) (discussing the “rational apathy story” as it relates to
shareholders); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1993) (explaining that because of the
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Gordon and Ron Gilson, who highlighted the differences between
institutional and individual investors.20 Yet, treating institutional investors as
a monolithic group misses a critical difference between passive and active
institutional investors. Passive funds, as their name implies, steer clear of
active involvement in their portfolio companies. They attract investors by
offering them low fees, a strategy that necessitates them to cut costs to the
bare minimum.21 Active funds, by contrast, play a unique role in financial
markets: they monitor the performance of their portfolio companies and
partake of initiatives intended to improve corporate governance.22 The
benefits of the actions undertaken by active funds extend to all market
participants—first and foremost, passive funds. As we will show, active
funds contribute to the overall efficiency of financial markets, benefitting all
market actors. To get a handle on the contribution of active funds to corporate
governance, it is necessary to revisit the basic trait of public corporations—
separation of ownership and control—and the problem of rational apathy to
which it gives rise.
A.

The Rational Apathy of Shareholders
In their seminal work on corporate law, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
identified the central challenge posed by the separation of ownership and
control in public corporations: the small stake of individual shareholders
gives them no real incentive to monitor management and be actively involved
in firms.23 Subsequent scholarship in the field of public choice has reinforced
their prediction.24 Of particular note is Mancur Olson’s The Logic of
Collective Action, which pointed to the phenomenon of dispersed
stockholders as an example of the inability of large and dispersed groups to
organizational structure of large U.S. corporations, “managers may run [a] firm in their own, rather
than the shareholders’ interest, choosing the quiet life over the maximization of share value”).
20. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865–67 (2013)
(distinguishing between the interests of retail investors, institutional investors, and activist hedge
funds).
21. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 508
(2018).
22. Many of their engagements are under the radar through communication with the
management rather than activism on the ballot. There are findings that indicate the prevalence of
engagements through communication with management. See Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias
Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preference of
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2906 (2016) (finding that 63% of the funds they have
surveyed have engaged in direct discussion with management in the last five years and 45% have
had private discussions with a company’s board outside of management’s presence).
23. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 112–16, 125 (1933).
24. See, e.g., Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 135 (2009) (arguing that in firms with dispersed ownership, no individual
shareholder has enough incentive to monitor management).
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further their interests.25 This phenomenon, largely known as the “rational
apathy of shareholders,” has received sustained attention in the corporate
governance literature.26
The problem of rational apathy is exacerbated by the inability of
individual shareholders to obtain financial information at a reasonable cost.
Individual shareholders typically lack the business acumen to get actively
involved in corporate management. Also, they are inadequately informed to
undertake this task. Active involvement in a firm’s management requires two
types of information: general market information and firm-specific
information. General market information requires analysis of industry-wide
and global economic conditions, trends, and forecasts.27 Firm-specific
information consists of data about the performance, structure, and potential
of individual firms.28 A typical individual shareholder readily possesses
neither type of information.
In theory, individual shareholders could purchase general market
information from professional analysts and glean information about firms in
which they invest. In practice, the cost of doing so is prohibitively high.
General market analysis can only be obtained at a very high price and it needs
to be updated constantly. Similarly, different types of firm-specific

25. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 55 (1965). Olson’s work is a systemized development of prior work in the field
of public choice with similar arguments. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 265–76 (1957) (defining the term “rational abstention”). Regarding the general
application of Olson’s work to the field of corporate governance, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 9.5 at 390–91 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820,
1837–40 (1989); and Rock, supra note 7, at 454–57.
26. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, CrossOwnership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from
Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 301 (Randall K. Morck ed.,
2000) (noting that when shareholders hold a small fraction of cash flow rights in a firm, agency
costs often increase); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 19, at 526–29
(describing the widespread acceptance of the shareholder impotence argument); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983)
(arguing that voters do not have the appropriate incentives to study the firm and vote intelligently);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the
Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 824 (1982) (noting that a rational shareholder may choose
not to incur the costs of becoming informed about management decisions); Henry G. Manne, Some
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1427, 1441 (1964) (noting that even shareholders who have the capacity to understand their voting
options often are not incentivized to undertake this effort).
27. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006).
28. Id.
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information are often kept secret,29 and even publicly available data can only
be accessed periodically. Furthermore, individual shareholders who commit
to information gathering, would need to do so on a continuous basis. This, of
course, would necessitate massive expenditures and involves a steep
opportunity cost. Once we account for the fact that most investors hold
diverse portfolios, it becomes abundantly clear that active monitoring is not
a practical option for individual shareholders. It is also undesirable from a
social perspective as it implicates duplicative investments in monitoring. The
problem is aggravated by the presence of free-riding opportunities: even
shareholders who might personally benefit from engaging in monitoring
would rather have other shareholders perform this task in order to reap the
benefits without incurring the cost.
Activism by dispersed individual shareholders is plagued by yet another
problem. Even if a shareholder were to incur the significant expense of
gathering the necessary information about a firm, she would not be able to
accomplish her desired goal. Dispersed ownership suggests that each
shareholder typically holds a tiny fraction of a firm’s shares. Consequently,
an individual shareholder stands no realistic chance of changing the firm’s
path. In the famous terminology of Albert Hirschman,30 she has no voice in
the company—or, to put the matter slightly differently, her voice will not be
heard. Realizing this much, no individual shareholder would invest the time
and money necessary to educate herself about a corporation’s affairs even if
she had the financial wherewithal to do so. The investment would simply go
to waste. Hence, the only sensible investment strategy for an individual
shareholder is to hold a diversified portfolio of firms, remain passive, and
rely on exiting (i.e., sale of shares) if she is dissatisfied with the performance
of firms in her portfolio.31
Indeed, most dispersed individual shareholders do not even show up to
vote, despite the negligible cost of doing so. Empirical data shows that retail
investors, who comprise approximately 30% of all shareholders in U.S.

29. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109
YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000) (arguing that when contracting, firms prefer to keep private certain
information, such as labor costs, inventory size, availability of alternative suppliers, and business
plans).
30. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 30 (“Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change,
rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs . . . .”).
31. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors 14 (Univ. of
Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-20, 2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (“[T]hey will remain passive in hopes of free riding on someone
else’s activism. As in other free riding situations, because everyone is subject to and likely to yield
to this temptation, the probability is that the good in question—here shareholder activism—will be
under-produced.”).
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public companies in 2019, voted only 28% of their proxies in 2019.32 The
cost of voting is negligible. Yet, a large majority of retail shareholders is not
willing to incur this minimal cost, let alone invest in additional information
to make a fully informed decision.
The low participation of dispersed individual shareholders significantly
weakens the central mechanism for confronting and reducing managerial
agency costs—board accountability and stockholder involvement in the firm.
As fewer stockholders vote in board elections, the board becomes less
accountable to stockholders and feels less obliged to promote their interests.
A board without strong accountability to stockholders has little reason to
insist that management decisions are aligned with stockholders’ interests.33
Thus, the low participation of individual shareholders impairs the important
role of voting in diminishing managerial agency costs.34
Investors’ utilization of the exit mechanism that consists of selling off
underperforming firms is also lower than the socially optimal level. It may
seem that the exit option is not undermined by the collective action problem
that plagues the voice mechanism since selling stocks does not require the
same level of investment as active involvement in the daily operations of
firms. Yet, informed selling decisions also necessitate investment of
resources in market-wide and firm-specific information.35 And while these
expenditures are smaller than those entailed by active participation in firms’
32. In contrast, institutional investors cast over 90% of their proxies. 2019 PROXY
SEASON REVIEW, PROXYPULSE (2019) 4–5, https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridgeproxypulse-2019-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/59P3-4B2Y].
33. Regarding the relatively low impact of shareholders on board elections in comparison to
management, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
680–82, 688–93 (2007).
34. The assumption in this Essay is that a larger participation of retail stockholders will reduce
the clout of managers. This might be contested in light of data reflecting that retail investors tend to
vote with managers to a greater extent than institutional investors. See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting
Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15 n.24 (2017)
(highlighting reports that show “retail investors are more likely to support management”); Kobi
Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’
Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 71–73 (2016) (detailing how retail investors’ participation can
distort voting outcomes in favor of management); see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 20, at 887
(noting that the vast majority of proposals up for vote in mutual funds are proposed by management).
Yet current numbers most likely do not reflect the rate in which retail investors would support
management after increasing participation of retail investors. In other words, the tendency of the
inframarginal retail investors to vote with management will be weaker than those currently voting.
A survey of retail investors conducted by the Brunswick Group serves as a strong indication for
such a gap. In a survey of 801 retail investors, it was found that most believe that activists add longterm value and may be more likely to support activists than generally thought. See Robert Moran &
Kaylan Normandeau, Retail Investors Cheer on the Activists, BRUNSWICK REV.: SPOTLIGHT ON
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM (Brunswick Group LLP, London, U.K.), 2015, at 14, https://
www.brunswickgroup.com/media/2140/shareholder-activism-issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HQ3RSTR] (summarizing findings from a Brunswick survey of retail investors—with 74% saying that
activism adds value); see also Fisch, supra (citing to a similar summary of the same survey).
35. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 721.
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management, they are significant in their own right. The existence of
sophisticated, active investors who engage in managing companies and make
informed trading decisions, enables other investors to form diversified
portfolios without bearing the costs of information gathering and data
analysis. Passive investors can simply monitor the actions of active funds and
follow in their footsteps. The presence of active funds diminishes the
expected value of independent information collection for other traders,
making free riding a profit-maximizing strategy.36 This dynamic explains, in
part, the increase in investment inflows to passive funds.
But free riding is not sustainable beyond a certain point. When a freeriding possibility exists, it will be the dominant strategy for most rational
actors. This dynamic also characterizes capital markets, undermining the
long-term profitability of active funds. If the percentage of active investors
falls below a certain threshold, public stock prices will become less reliable
as the lion’s share of the trading will consist of uniformed trading by passive
funds. This, in turn, would hinder efficient pricing in financial markets, and
consequently result in a suboptimal allocation of resources.
B.

The Positive Effect of Active Funds on Financial Markets
Active funds differ from most other investors. They provide unique
services to the firms in which they invest. Critically, the value of the services
provided by active funds extends well beyond the boundaries of their
portfolio companies. In the paragraphs to follow, we will enumerate the
benefits that accrue to other market participants and the public at large from

36. The free riding of passive funds on the information-collecting efforts exerted by active funds
is exemplified by the staggering gap in fees between active and passive funds: the average
management fees of active funds are approximately six times higher than the average management
fees of passive funds. See Patricia Oey, Investors See Largest Ever Decline in Fund Fees,
MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/861288/investors-seelargest-ever-decline-in-fund-fees [https://perma.cc/EUJ5-3YZK] (summarizing a 2017 study that
found the asset-weighted average net expense ratio was 0.11% for U.S. equity index funds, in
contrast to actively managed U.S. funds, in which the ratio was over six times more and stood at
0.73%). Due to the free riding effect, active funds do not reap any benefit from their additional
costs. Ample data shows that their performance is equivalent to or even worse than that of passive
funds. See, e.g., Ben Johnson, The Morningstar Active/Passive Barometer Might Help Investors
Improve Their Base Rates, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/articles
/945906/the-morningstar-activepassive-barometer-might-help-investors-improve-their-base-rates
[https://perma.cc/7QQP-7KY5] (“As is apparent in the accompanying table, actively managed funds
have generally underperformed their passive counterparts, especially over longer time horizons”);
BEN JOHNSON, ALEX BRYAN & ADAM MCCULLOUGH, MORNINGSTAR, MORNINGSTAR’S ACTIVE
/PASSIVE BAROMETER (Aug. 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared
/Company/LandingPages/Research/Documents/Morningstar_Active_Passive_Barometer_2018
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3V-6CQ7] (“The average dollar in passively managed funds has tended to
outperform the average dollar invested in actively managed funds. . . . Investors would greatly
improve their odds of success by favoring low-cost funds, which succeeded far more often than
high-cost funds over the long term.”).
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the strategies employed by active funds. As we will show, these effects are
significant, and their contribution to the quality of corporate governance
cannot be understated.
1. Positive Externalities for Other Shareholders.—Active funds improve
corporate governance in firms along two dimensions: first, they raise the
quality of decision-making processes within the firm; and second, they curtail
the ability of managers to extract private benefits at the expense of
shareholders by engaging in continuous monitoring of the firms’ decisions.
To put the matter differently, active funds perform the important function of
ensuring that management and board members abide by the two duties
imposed on them by law: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
Improved decision-making processes act as a safeguard against
violations of the duty of care by lowering the risk of harmful business
decisions. Moreover, they limit the ability of management to funnel value
from the shareholders to themselves. In some instances, shareholder
engagement can also police against violations of the duty of loyalty by
preventing directors and corporate officers from engaging in self-dealing
transactions. In other instances, it can serve to discipline management by
inducing it to act more ethically, within the limits of the duty of loyalty—for
example, by restricting managerial power to devise generous compensation
schemes for itself.
While the duty of loyalty has been the epicenter of corporate law and
has attracted close scrutiny from courts and legislators, the duty of care has
largely evaded intense judicial review and has been subjected to the
permissive business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, the
decisions and actions of boards and directors enjoy immunity from judicial
intervention as long as they are adequately informed and made in good faith
and without conflict of interest.37 This means that the law consciously leaves
business decisions to the discretion of management and boards. It is
important to note that corporate law is less concerned about substandard
decision-making not because it is a rare phenomenon; on the contrary, bad
decision-making is more prevalent than outright violations of the duty of
loyalty.38 Yet, the law gives a lot of leeway to management when it comes to
business decisions in order not to exert a chilling effect on corporate directors

37. Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 521, 529–30 (2013).
38. See, e.g., Dan Lovallo and Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY
Q., March 2010, at 1, 3, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporatefinance/our-insights/the-case-for-behavioral-strategy [https://perma.cc/D4Q7-MY3C] (reporting a
recent McKinsey Quarterly survey of 2,207 executives, in which 60% said they thought bad strategic
decisions were as frequent as good decisions and 12% said they thought good decisions were
infrequent).
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and officers by reviewing their decisions retrospectively.39 Consequently,
shareholder engagements can be particularly valuable in this context. Active
shareholders can fill the gap left by courts and provide the much-needed
quality control. Unlike courts, whose review is primarily procedural under
the garb of the business judgment rule, active shareholders can review the
substance of managerial decisions and evaluate them on the merits.40
Active funds reap some of the benefit of the improved performance
generated by themselves, on account of the appreciation in their equity stake.
Yet they only capture a fraction of the benefit generated by their actions. The
remainder is captured by the other shareholders, whose investments increase
in value as a result of the engagement of active shareholders. Active funds
cannot recoup a greater portion of the benefit they generate without buying
out the other shareholders. But this option is impracticable, of course.
2. Positive Externalities of Engagements on the Market at Large.—The
positive externalities of engagements are not limited to shareholders of
the target company. The involvement of sophisticated shareholders in the
management of firms generates market-wide benefits that transcend the
boundaries of individual firms. Specifically, they can improve governance
norms and structures across the board. As we will show, the salutary effects
of active fund engagements can be divided into two perspectives: the ex ante
perspective and the ex post perspective. We discuss them in order.
a. The Ex Ante Effect.—The ex ante perspective focuses on the
disciplining effect of potential interventions, or threats of intervention. True,
at present, active funds rarely initiate strategic challenges to managerial
policy in the form of proposals for spinoffs, capital restructurings, and
cutbacks on research and development costs. Such initiatives are typically
39. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). Dismissing a
shareholder claim for relief, the court explained:
[D]irectors will tend to deviate from [a] rational acceptance of corporate risk if in
authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume
some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for
any resulting corporate loss.
....
. . . [A] very small probability of director liability based on “negligence”, “inattention”,
“waste”, etc., could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to
any extent!
Id.; see also Joshua Mitts, Comment, Recoupment Under Dodd-Frank: Punishing Financial
Executives and Perpetuating “Too Big to Fail,” 122 YALE L.J. 507, 513 (2012) (“The potentially
crippling chilling effect of judicial second-guessing of directors’ decisions is precisely what
motivated the development of the business judgment rule in Delaware corporate law.”).
40. See Maria Goranova & Lori Verstegen Ryan, Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary
Review, 40 J. MGMT. 1230, 1241 (2014) (“Although both governance and hedge fund activists
ultimately seek to improve firm performance, they employ different methods and time horizons, as
well as different perspectives on managerial decision-making prerogatives.”).
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the domain of activist hedge funds that openly confront management.41 This
does not mean, however, that active funds play no role in affecting such
changes. Active funds can throw their weight behind the initiatives of hedge
funds. In fact, they often do and have an inherent incentive to join such
efforts. In 2018 and 2019, active funds increasingly supported the campaigns
and initiatives of activist hedge funds.42 The support of active funds
dramatically enhances the probability of success of the measures undertaken
by activist hedge funds. Hence, indirectly, active funds exert a disciplining
effect on managements and boards. Without the support of active funds, the
engagements of activist hedge funds would have been far less effective.43
Naturally, these engagements are undesirable from the vantage point of
both managers and directors, as they represent a threat to their continued
employment and erode their power to run the firm as they wish.44 Most
managements and boards negatively perceive shareholder engagements and
strive to avoid them.45 Accordingly, managements and boards would be
41. Regarding the critical function of activist hedge funds for improving corporate governance,
see Kobi Kastiel & Adi Libson, Global Antitakeover Devices, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 149–150
(2019).
42. Shawn Tully, A Wall Street Revolution: Why Active Fund Managers Have ‘Stopped
Yawning and Started Flexing Their Muscles,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://
fortune.com/2019/10/24/wall-street-revolution-active-managers [https://perma.cc/4KDQ-Q4ZB]
(pointing to the growing support of traditional active investors such as T. Rowe Price, Neuberger
Berman, and Wellington Management of activist campaigns and emphasizing that passive funds do
not have an interest in joining the wave due to their lack of an incentive to analyze specific reforms);
Leslie P. Norton, ‘Corporate America Had Better Take Note.’ Fund Managers Are the New Activist
Investors, BARRON’S (Apr. 5, 2019, 8:43 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/mutual-fundmanagers-activist-investors-51554498763 [https://perma.cc/75BT-6HFV] (pointing to Wellington
Management, a traditional active managed fund, and its opposition to Bristol-Myers Squibb as a
landmark of the growing activism among traditional actively managed funds).
43. It should be noted that, in principle, activist hedge funds may also be eligible for such credit,
given that they, too, confer positive externalities on other shareholders through their engagements
with companies. Yet, in their case, the need for a tax credit is much lower since they capture most
of the positive impact of their engagement through the sizeable block of shares they own in
companies with which they engage. Regarding the positive impact of hedge funds on the market as
a whole, and their relationship with institutional investors, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 20, at
896–901.
44. Even though the activists may have the same goal as management and even the same time
horizon, management may justify not listening to the activists on the basis of their own belief in an
idiosyncratic value that they cannot fully disclose to the activists. Regarding the possibility that
management may have an idiosyncratic vision that other outside shareholders cannot observe, see
Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560,
577–79 (2016).
45. Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang have examined shareholder engagements and, despite concerns
regarding their long-term negative impact, have found empirical evidence of a positive long-term
impact for such engagements. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1135–44 (2015) (demonstrating that
two kinds of engagements particularly feared by managements and boards—engagements calling
for limiting investments and engagements that use adversarial tactics—have no empirical adverse
effect on the long-term performance of companies).
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inclined to go to great lengths to fend off the perceived threat of shareholder
engagement.46 It should be noted that activist hedge funds tend to converge
on companies that adopt antitakeover clauses, such as staggered boards and
poison pills, as potential targets for engagement.47 In response to this
tendency, managements and boards may refrain, ab initio, from adopting
such mechanisms in order to minimize a company’s exposure to
engagements, even though such measures that protect managements and
boards against hostile takeovers would have been favored absent the threat
of activist shareholder engagement.
Management would similarly be cautious regarding any type of
corporate behavior that may trigger engagements by activist hedge funds,
such as high expense levels, empire building, avoidance of merger or
acquisition opportunities that stand to enhance shareholder value, and the
appointment of unprofessional board members who have ties to management.
As the incidence of sophisticated shareholders’ engagement grows,
managements and boards will become increasingly cautious to adopt such
behavior. This, in turn, benefits all shareholders.
The intensity of the ex ante effect of shareholder engagements on
managements and boards depends on the perceived likelihood of such an
occurrence, which, in turn, is a function of the number of engagements in the
market. Every additional engagement increases the ex ante disciplining effect
of the engagement on all the other firms in the market. While this effect may
appear negligible relative to the effect on the company that an activist
actually engages, it is not necessarily true. Importantly, the impact of activists
on the target company has the potential to create market-wide ripple effects.48
Naturally, the direct impact of an engagement may be limited in many cases
to the target firm, but the indirect deterrent effect may impact hundreds of
companies.
In this respect, it should be added that although, at present, active hedge
funds largely leave the role of initiating strategic engagements to activist
hedge funds, the introduction of a targeted incentive, such as a tax credit of
the type we propose in subpart III(B), can alter the behavior of active funds.
46. According to PwC’s 2018 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, directors are increasingly
indicating that shareholder activism has compelled companies to more effectively evaluate strategy,
execution, and capital allocation. PWC GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS CTR., PWC’S 2018
ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 1–2, 4–5, 7–8, 14, 17–19 (2018), https://www
.pwc.es/es/publicaciones/consejos-y-buen-gobierno/pwc-annual-corporate-directors-survey-2018
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPW6-G8GM].
47. C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund
Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 298, 308–09
(2016); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 713, 722–23 (2003) (noting that companies with antitakeover clauses, at least at the IPO
stage, appear to be more attractive to investors).
48. See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, tax benefits can enhance the tendency of active funds to engage
in more aggressive interventions. It is not unprecedented for active funds to
engage firm managements,49 and under appropriate incentives, this strategy
can become more prevalent. As we will explain, active funds are highly
responsive to economic incentives, and if offered a tax credit, they are likely
to adopt policies that qualify them for it.50
b. The Ex Post Effect of Corporate Governance Changes on Other
Firms.—The ex post perspective focuses on interventions that have already
occurred, as opposed to hypothetical ones. An improvement in the
governance regime of one firm may trigger a similar improvement in other
firms. As long as the market is competitive and incorporates an effective
share pricing mechanism, firms cannot remain idle when competitors
improve. Hence, if one firm decreases managerial compensation or
eliminates its staggered board, its rivals will be forced to follow suit.51
This positive externality can explain the surprising finding that the
number of independent directors in a firm is not correlated with stronger
performance.52 Jeffrey Gordon has explained this result by pointing to the
market-wide effect of independent directors, arguing that competitive
pressures force firms to adopt value enhancing measures executed by their
rivals even if they have weaker corporate governance structures.53 Similarly,
it can be expected that activist engagements that increase the share value of
the target firm will be adopted by its rivals, even though they do not face the
threat of an activist engagement.
An additional reason why engagement-driven changes in some firms
may impact non-engaged firms is based on the force of social norms.

49. See supra note 42.
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2007).
52. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 935–36 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L.
231, 239 (2002) (examining the correlation between independence of boards and its impact years
ahead, in order to address the argument that the impact of independence of the firm is mainly in the
long-run); see also Ozcan Isik & Ali Riza Ince, Board Size, Board Composition and Performance:
An Investigation on Turkish Banks, 9 INT’L BUS. RES., 74, 81 (2016) (finding a negative but
statistically insignificant correlation between the percentage of outside directors on the board and
firm performance in the Turkish banking industry). For similar results that found a negative
correlation between the number of outside directors on the board in UK companies, and profitability
measures, Tobin’s Q, and stock returns, see Paul M. Guest, The Impact of Board Size on Firm
Performance: Evidence from the UK, 15 EUR. J. FIN. 385, 386 (2009).
53. Gordon, supra note 51.
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Managers and boards care about market norms.54 They may, therefore, be
reluctant to adopt certain practices that promote their own self-interest, if they
are uncommon among other market actors. Managers and board members do
not want to be perceived as outliers in the adoption of certain aggressive
measures, irrespective of market threats, such as activist engagements. Due
to individuals’ self-concept maintenance, i.e., their desire to maintain their
ethical self-image, they are concerned with behaving in a socially accepted
manner, even if they would have been able to increase their private payoffs
otherwise.55
A possible example of this is the declining trend of adopting
antitakeover clauses, such as staggered boards and poison pills. Managers
and boards have been willing to adopt antitakeover provisions when such
provisions are pervasive in other firms, but are reluctant to adopt them when
the market norm is to shun them. This may explain the steep decrease in the
adoption of such measures between the beginning of the 21st century and a
decade later.56 Each shareholder engagement for the cancelation of such
clauses not only affects the likelihood that the firm they engage with will
cancel such measures, but also the likelihood that another firm will maintain
these provisions. Accordingly, the beneficial effects of activism extend well
beyond the target firm and creates value for other market actors.
II.

A Tax Mechanism for Enhancing Active Investment
The classic economic solution to the problem of externalities—both
negative and positive—is to impose a tax or subsidy on the externalitygenerating activity. As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have explained,
“The traditional view of economists has been that corrective taxes are
superior to direct regulation of harmful externalities when the state’s
54. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999) (examining the interrelation between social norms and the desire for financial gain as
motivators for corporate actors). Social norms also function as the basis for the utilization of
shaming in the realm of corporate law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820 (2001) (“Shaming sanctions are so integrally connected to social norms that
it is not entirely clear where one leaves off and the other begins.”). For a more general discussion
of the role of social norms in the legal realm, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social
Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy (Yale Law Sch., Program for Studies in Law,
Economics & Public Policy, Working Paper No. 230, 1999), https://ssrn.com/abstract=191392 and
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
55. For background studies on what factors influence the psychology of individual behavior
when reacting to group norms, see generally Jay W. Jackson, Reactions to Social Dilemmas Are
Influenced by Group Identification Motives, in 16 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH 167
(Serge P. Shohov ed., 2002) and Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman & Yuval Feldman, The
Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium, 4 REV. L. &
ECON. 889 (2008).
56. Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Activism and the Shift to Annual Director
Elections, 14 J. ACCT. & FIN. 83, 83 (2014) (describing a decrease in the number of firms with a
staggered board from 60% of the S&P 500 in 2001 to fewer than 20% in 2014).
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information about control costs is incomplete.”57 Taxes dominate regulation
because they do not require the government to possess information regarding
the cost of eliminating the negative externalities or the cost of generating the
positive externalities.58 According to Kaplow and Shavell, this is true even
when the magnitude of the external effects changes through time in order to
reach the optimal amount of the external effect they dominate.59
Under the model that originated with Arthur Cecil Pigou, activities that
generate negative externalities, i.e., harmful external effects, ought to be
subjected to a positive tax.60 The tax should be commensurate with the
marginal social harm caused by the activity in order to reduce the level of the
harm-causing activity to the social optimum. Otherwise, actors would fail to
consider the full cost of their actions and we would face an excess supply of
harm-causing activities. Activities that engender positive externalities, i.e.,
benefit others,61 call for the mirror-image solution. Such activities will be
undersupplied by the market since the actor captures only a portion of the
benefit she produces.62 Hence, to induce optimal supply of benefit
engendering activities, we propose that the state use negative taxes, in the
form of tax credits, to make up for the shortfall in the incidence and
magnitude of active engagements.63 Because the state does not possess
complete information regarding the real costs and private benefits of
monitoring and active engagement, the use of taxes would induce private
actors to internalize the external effects of monitoring and enable them to
determine the amount they should invest in monitoring. Regulation, by
contrast, on account of its rigidity cannot achieve this result.
Naturally, readers can agree with our policy analysis and our preference
for taxation over regulation, but nonetheless wonder why the internalization
of the benefits produced by active funds should be done on the firm level.64
57. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17; see also Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter
R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV.
23, 44–49 (2006) (explaining why employing Pigouvian subsidies is the most efficient way for the
government to structure individual income tax incentives absent certain information); Peter S.
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 40–
42 (2013) (discussing the use of fees in patent law as a policy instrument to influence applicant
behavior).
58. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17, at 5–7.
59. Id. at 11–12.
60. PIGOU, supra note 11, at 172–174.
61. See, e.g., id. at 178–79 (describing such a situation in the landlord–tenant context).
62. Id.
63. See infra subparts II(A–B).
64. There are various possible mechanisms by which the company could compensate active
funds. For example, it can allocate a certain percentage of its revenues to cover the costs of the
monitoring of institutional investors over the firm, or provide a portion of the companies’ funds to
certain outcomes caused by institutional investors, such as the acceptance of their shareholder
proposals.
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After all, the main benefactors of the monitoring and other interventions
provided by active funds are the other shareholders of the company, and thus,
so the argument goes, they alone should pay for the benefit bestowed upon
them by active funds. This argument should be rejected for three reasons.
First, as we noted, the positive externalities of active funds extend far beyond
the individual firm. The introduction of improved governance standards in
one firm, is likely to lead to similar improvements in competing firms.
Second, engagements by active funds increase the profitability of firms,
which in turn, raises tax revenues. Accordingly, the public at large also
benefits from the activities of active funds. Therefore, it is fitting to fund the
activities of active funds from the public fisc and thereby adopt a broader
base for accounting for costs and benefits. Finally, the internalization of
externalities on the company level would not necessarily eliminate free
riding. If the company alone must fund the initiatives espoused by active
funds, shareholders may opt to block the proposals of active funds, wait out
a certain period, and then initiate the same measures on their own in order to
avoid paying the fund. The use of tax credits would eliminate such free riding.
For these reasons, we are of the view that the appropriate policy response to
the plight of active funds must center on tax incentives.
Our view does not entail, however, that the tax incentives we envision
must be financed by the public at large. On the contrary, the tax credit we
propose can be budget neutral.65 Under this design, the tax would be borne
by investors at large. It is also possible to adopt a tax design that would
impose the tax burden only on passive funds, by limiting the tax increase to
gains generated by passive funds. Society at large, including members who
do not invest in capital markets, does not have to incur the tax burden for
financing the tax credit. The tax burden could be limited to investors at large
or even be restricted to passive funds.
In designing a tax scheme that can level the playfield between passive
and active funds, policymakers can employ two primary tools: effort-based
tax credits and result-based tax credits. The two categories are not mutually
exclusive and can therefore be combined. In the next two subparts, we offer
a detailed blueprint of how the two types of tax incentives can be tailored to
optimize the benefits generated by active funds.
A.

Effort-Based Tax Credits
The most straightforward tax credit is one that directly subsidizes the
activity we wish to enhance. If we want institutional investors to invest more

65. Even though the nominal rate of tax imposed on investments in passive funds will be higher,
it may equalize the effective tax rate paid on investments in passive and active funds. As we will
explain further on in subpart III(B), because the turnover ratio in active funds is higher and
realization of profits is much more frequent, the tax liability they generate is higher.
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in stewardship and analysis, we could subsidize the expenses of the activity.
For example, the federal government can give them a 50% tax rebate, on top
of the standard deduction, on expenses incurred on employing analysts that
monitor corporate governance or portfolio building and expenses on brokers
that execute trade. Providing an additional tax credit would increase the
institutional investors’ investment in analysis personnel as it would reduce
the net cost of such personnel for institutional investors. A tax credit for
stewardship and analysis expenses can narrow the gap between active and
passive funds. As we discussed in subpart I(B), passive funds free ride on the
monitoring services provided by active funds.66 As a result, they can afford
to charge lower fees and attract more investments. On average, active funds
are over four times more expensive than passive funds.67 Offering a favorable
tax treatment to active funds can help level the playing field. First, it would
reduce the expenses of active funds and enable them to charge lower fees.
Second, it may increase the number of active funds both by inviting new entry
and by converting some passive funds into active ones.
A different benchmark that may be utilized as a basis for tax credits is
trading frequency. Most passive funds pursue a “buy and hold” strategy and
do not engage in frequent trading, while active funds engage in a high level
of trading.68 As discussed in Part I, such trading functions as a disciplining
mechanism that benefits other shareholders as well, thus constituting a
positive externality. In light of this difference between active and passive
funds, it is possible to institute a tax credit that tracks trading frequency. Such
a credit will also be more effective in distinguishing between real active funds
and what the literature calls “closet index funds,” i.e., passive funds that seek
to pass themselves off as active funds.69

66. Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV.
687, 696–697 (2019).
67. BEN JOHNSON & ADAM MCCULLOUGH, MORNINGSTAR, U.S. FUND FEE STUDY 1
(Apr. 2019),
https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research
/USFundFeeStudyApr2019.pdf?utm_source=eloqua&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=&utm
_content=17040 [https://perma.cc/FAS3-RYPN] (finding that the average fee in passive funds was
0.15% for 2018 and that of active funds was 0.67%).
68. Russell R. Wermers, Active Investing and the Efficiency of Security Markets, 19 J. INV.
MGMT. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353956 (describing the
evidence in the financial literature of the positive correlation between stock more heavily held by
actively managed funds and their liquidity level, i.e., higher trading frequency, and the evidence for
the causal relationship: that the active managers generate the greater liquidity).
69. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay
For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31, 33, 38 (2016) (defining
closet index funds and noting that active managers justify higher fees in part based on higher
expenses associated with increased trading activity, even where active funds might not actually trade
more frequently than passive funds). We address the issue of the manipulability of the benchmarks
we propose in section III(B)(3).
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One may argue that institutional investors, especially large ones, would
be apathetic to the actual costs of such personnel. For example, the “Big
Three”—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—alone have under 5 trillion
dollars under management and, hence, the proposed tax rebate will have no
direct effect on them. Yet a careful examination of their costs suggests that
our tax rebate will affect them. The Big Three’s expenses on stewardship
services constitute 0.00018% to 0.00029% of their assets under
management.70 Accordingly, in the case of the Big Three, a 50% rebate could
translate to estimated savings of 11.7 million dollars given current
investment on stewardship services.71 This is no small amount even for the
Big Three, and if our proposal is implemented, it would have the effect of
inducing greater investment in stewardship services, and, correspondingly,
greater tax returns.
One concern about tax credits in general is “leakage”: subsidization of
behavior that would have happened even without the favorable tax treatment.
Awarding tax credits for behavior that would have occurred in their absence
is wasteful from a social perspective as it involves significant cost for the
public without affecting the behavior of the target group. To avoid this
problem, we propose that the tax credit would only apply to expenditures in
excess of passive funds’ current spending on analysis services and trading.
For example, if we know that currently, without a tax credit, large passive
funds spend at least 0.14% of their aggregate fees and expenses on
stewardship services, the tax credit should apply only to expenditures that
surpass that percentage.72 Similarly, if passive funds engage in a certain
number of trades per portfolio company, active funds would only be given
credits for trades in excess of this number.
Of course, efforts may fall short of bringing about the desired outcome.
Spending more on monitoring and analysis services does not necessarily
result in better corporate performance. Yet, effort-based credits have an
important virtue: they spur actors to try to bring about change when success
is uncertain. In our case, it is especially important to offer effort-based tax
credits because sophisticated investors often operate under conditions of
uncertainty. Whether they are ultimately successful or not, they must sink
considerable costs in the pursuit of their desired result. Furthermore, as we
demonstrated in subsection I(B)(2)(a), even failed engagements generate

70. These numbers are derived by dividing the estimated stewardship investment for each of the
companies by the assets under management in each company. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index
Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029, 2077–78 (2019).
71. This figure is based on estimated expenses on stewardship services. Id. at 2078.
72. Id. (revealing that BlackRock’s spending is 0.15% of its total fees and expenses, Vanguard’s
is 0.18%, and State Street Global Advisors’ is 0.14%, which is the lowest of the three and could be
used as a reference point).
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positive externalities. The threat of engagement in and of itself affects
managerial behavior.
Hence, it is very important that efforts, too, would entitle active
investors to receive tax credits. It should be borne in mind that even though
active funds do not typically face liquidity constraints, they may not be highly
motivated to engage in measures that do not have a high probability of
success. As noted earlier, monitoring corporate governance is not the bread
and butter of most institutional investors, and thus when such activities
involve risk, they may be reluctant to spend on uncertain initiatives. For this
reason, they may be much more responsive to an effort-based tax credit
scheme that offers them a reward for performing a certain desirable activity.73
B.

Result-Based Tax Credits
The second form of credit we propose is a result-based credit. The resultbased credit is conditioned on the occurrence of a certain predetermined
result. The use of result-based tax credits requires policymakers to address
two distinct questions. First, they must determine which results qualify for
the credit. Second, they must decide how to calculate it. Our discussion will
address both issues.
1. Defining Desirable Outcomes of Active Trading.—In devising a list of
outcomes that entitle institutional investors to tax credits, it is necessary to
keep two objects in mind. First, the outcomes should lead to improvements
in corporate governance. Second, the outcomes should be associated with
activism—that is, they should be able to affect separation between active
funds and passive funds and ensure that only the former are entitled to the
credit. The outcomes we propose meet both criteria.
a. Informed Voting.—Informed voting constitutes an important vehicle
for improving corporate governance. Voting on its own, though, does not
necessarily entail substantive engagement with corporations. Nor does it
create a meaningful separation between active and passive funds. The litmus
test for separating active and passive funds should be informed voting. By
our lights, voting is informed when it is based on specific analysis of the

73. There is a literature on mechanism design, and in personal economics as well, that addresses
this issue. See, e.g., EDWARD P. LAZEAR & MICHAEL GIBBS, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS IN PRACTICE
109–70 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing how to allocate decision-making in a company and how to
structure a firm’s overall organization); Canice Prendergast, The Tenuous Trade-off Between Risk
and Incentives, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1071 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between pay-forperformance contracts and observed measures of uncertainty in the agency context to challenge the
existence of a negative trade-off between risk and incentives). For a similar discussion regarding
the optimal design of a Pigouvian tax, see Adi Libson, Confronting the Retirement Savings Problem:
Redesigning the Saver’s Credit, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 207, 240–44 (2017).
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relevant firm. Hence, only funds that invest in analysts should be entitled to
a tax credit.
There are two ways by which institutional investors can exert influence
on firms’ voice mechanisms. The first is their influence on substantive
decisions the firms are facing, which require the approval of shareholders.
This category includes conflicted transactions, compensation policy, and
end-game decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions in particular.74 The
second is by instituting pro-shareholder voting rules, such as proxy-access
rules,75 cumulative voting rules,76 limitations on dual-class stock structures,77
and majority voting rules (instead of plurality voting rules).78 These goals are

74. The voting power of institutional investors is fairly high. Their large portion of the shares is
compounded by their higher tendency to vote than retail investors. Scholars estimate that, on
average, the votes of institutional investors constitute 87.7% of all votes cast. See Miriam SchwartzZiv & Russ Wermers, Do Institutional Investors Monitor Their Large vs. Small Investments
Differently? Evidence from the Say-on-Pay Vote 9 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance,
Working Paper No. 541/2017, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096745 (stating that institutional
investors constitute 69.63% of the outstanding shares of the average stock and vote 90% of their
proxies, in contrast to retail investors whose voting rate is around 29%). Say-on-pay serves as an
example for the utilization of shareholder votes in the ongoing monitoring of the company.
Currently, 12.8% of shareholders vote against compensation packages in say-on-pay proxies. Id. at
10. The voting of institutional investors on say-on-pay matters is not solely determined by proxy
advisors such as ISS. On average, 11% of institutional investors voted against the recommendation
of proxy advisors on say-on-pay. Id. at 37. Regarding the agency problem of proxy advisory firms
and how it could be addressed, see Asaf Eckstein, Skin in the Game for Credit Rating Agencies and
Proxy Advisors, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 221 (2017).
75. See CORP. GOVERNANCE POLICIES § 3.2 (COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS 2019),
https://www.cii.org/files/ciicorporategovernancepolicies/09_17_19_corp_gov_policies.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/QF7P-SUMV] (stipulating that “[c]ompanies should provide access to management
proxy materials for a long-term investor or group of long-term investors owning in aggregate at
least three percent of a company’s voting stock, to nominate less than a majority of the directors”);
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784,
1795–97 (2006) (proposing that “shareholder power over rules-of-the-game decisions should
accompany a new default arrangement making it easier for shareholders to replace incumbent
directors”). But see Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY
L.J. 435 (2011) (arguing that even if proxy-access rules may have significant advantages, they
should be left for private ordering and not be mandated); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The
Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 (2011) (foreseeing that proxy-access rules
would have a low impact on the nomination of new directors).
76. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1947–49 (1996) (advocating for cumulative voting as “a central element of
self-enforcing corporate law”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look
at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124 (1994) (proposing the adoption of cumulative voting
to give institutions additional leverage in board-composition negotiations and enhance the directors’
sense of independence).
77. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017) (arguing for imposing a time restriction on the utilization of a
dual-class structure).
78. See MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2016-2019)
AND 2020 SEASON PREVIEW 23 (2019), https://cclg.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/Proxy-Voting-
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achieved by amending a corporation’s charter or its by-laws, and enabling
small shareholders to have greater impact on the firm’s decision via their
voice. Active funds that partake in such activities should qualify for tax
credits under our proposal.
b. Board Composition.—A second way by which institutional investors
can influence corporate decisions is via changes in board composition. The
most basic and most common level is by voting and supporting the most
competent director on the slate. Cumulative voting enables institutional
investors to have an impact on the board, even in companies with centralized
ownership, by allowing institutional investors to concentrate all their voting
power to support a certain candidate for the board, instead of spreading it on
all candidates.
Institutional investors can amplify their voice by actively suggesting
candidates up for vote, and not merely supporting certain candidates from a
given list. Institutional investors’ familiarity with the market puts them in a
unique position to identify board candidates that fit the characteristics of each
individual firm. Identifying suitable board candidates is a challenging and
time-consuming task that may even require a proxy fight with the
management in some cases. Although this type of conduct is atypical for
institutional investors at present, its prevalence may grow if a tax credit is
given for such behavior.
Appointing a candidate to the board is the most impactful measure that
can be taken by an institutional investor. A board seat gives rise to two
important advantages. The first is unmediated access to non-public
information about the firm and the power to influence decision-making
within the firm. The second is interaction with the top management of the
company and an opportunity to provide meaningful input. The strategy of
demanding a board seat is common among activist hedge funds. It is less
common among conventional active funds. The reason is that board
representation can be an obstacle to trading. An active fund that appoints one
of its employees to the board of a company runs the risk of violating the
regulations that restrict insider trading and must forgo various trade
Analytics-2016-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/A329-MEK5] (reporting a significant increase in the
2019 proxy season of companies that adopted majority voting rules led by institutional investors—
from five in 2018 to twenty-two in 2019); DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 74–75 (2018) (describing how majority voting has
transformed shareholder voting by “mak[ing] candidates and board members more accountable to
shareholders”). But see Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does
Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2016) (presenting
data that supports a skeptical view as to whether adoption of a majority voting rule has significant
impact on firms); William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 487 (2007) (concluding that a majority voting rule does not have
any real impact and “is little more than smoke and mirrors”).
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opportunities in order to remain compliant.79 For this reason, board
representation is not a strategy that standard active funds are likely to adopt.80
If they do, it should entitle them to a tax credit.
c. Shareholder Proposals.—Shareholder proposals provide another
example of active, voice-based participation. Yet, their actual impact is rather
limited. Shareholder proposals typically involve requests for greater
disclosure. Shareholder proposals cannot be made regarding ordinary
business decisions.81 Furthermore, the low cost of making such proposals
implies that they can be easily manipulated. For this reason, lawmakers
should carefully weigh the pros and cons of using shareholder proposals as a
benchmark for granting tax credits. Of course, only proposals that are
accepted should entitle funds to credit, and we are of the opinion that the
credit, if recognized, should be relatively low.
2. Setting the Credit.—There are two possible ways to determine the
value of result-based credits. First, it can be assessed in absolute terms based
on the cost of the engagement. Alternatively, it is possible to set the credit as
a certain percentage of the increase in firm value. In the proceeding
discussion, we analyze the pros and cons of each method. Result-based tax
credits can be pegged to share prices. Because we focus on public companies,
it is possible to estimate the value of the engagement based on the change in
price of the share after the engagement, while controlling all other relevant
factors, such as general trends in the sector or the market.

79. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(a) (2020) (limiting the ability of the insiders to the trade the
company’s stock, in order to eliminate insider trading). Regarding the ability to attribute the
limitations on directors to the fund that they represent on the board, see Nader H. Salehi, Andrew J.
Dunbar & Benjamin J. Hoffart, Trading by Corporate Directors and Their Affiliated Investment
Funds, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Nov. 2013), https://www.sidley.com/-/media/files/publications
/2013/11/trading-by-corporate-directors-and-their-affilia__/files/view-article/fileattachment/finalbest-law-firms-2014-article-2-pages—11-05__.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/U4JV-VFH8].
Leakage of nonpublic information through board members that represent funds also occurs. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors
and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 CORNELL L.
REV. 381, 418–27 (2019) (finding that an information leakage exists when activist directors are
appointed to the board, but not when other activists are appointed).
80. Nonetheless, there are active funds, specifically state pension funds, such as CalSTRS
(California State Teachers Retirement System), CalPERS, and NYSTERS that are represented on
boards. For example, CalSTRS, which held together with its partner Relational Investors LLC 7.3%
of its outstanding shares of Timken, has a representative sitting on the board of Timken. See
WILLIAM LAZONICK & JANG-SUP SHIN, PREDATORY VALUE EXTRACTION: HOW THE LOOTING OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION BECAME THE U.S. NORM AND HOW SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY CAN
BE RESTORED 136 (2020) (detailing the co-investment of CalSTRS and Relational Investors LLC
in Timken).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(7) (2020).
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Using changes in share price as a measure of the value of an engagement
has a clear advantage. One of the central challenges of Pigouvian taxes and
subsidies is quantification. The use of Pigouvian taxes necessitates an
estimation of the magnitude of the externality. Absent an accurate estimation,
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies generate positive and negative errors. In our
case, however, the market provides a potential mechanism for quantifying the
positive externality. The positive externalities of engagements by active
hedge funds is represented, in part, by the change in share price between the
shares of the companies in their portfolio and the share prices of other
companies in the same industry.82 Yet, the market may not be as effective a
tool as it may first seem for estimating the economic value of engagements.
There is much evidence suggesting that the stock market is not efficient in
the strong sense.83 Hence, it may not necessarily readily reflect the full value
of an engagement.
While we are fully cognizant of this problem, share price changes
constitute a useful, albeit imperfect, measure for estimating the positive
effect of sophisticated shareholder engagements. Tying the credit to changes
in share price also requires policymakers to decide whether to rely on shortterm or long-term effects. There is a heated debate among corporate law
scholars as to which effect should dominate. According to the view that
maintains that there is no gap between the short-term and long-term outcomes
of activist engagements, the relevant date could be set closer to the date of
the announcement of the engagement.84 According to the view maintaining
that there is a gap between a target company’s performance in the short term
and in the long term, the effect of the engagement should be assessed two to
three years after its occurrence.85
Fortunately, we do not need to take sides. The tax credit mechanism we
provide can be applied in the short term or long term. As we pointed out, it
is a flexible tool that is perfectly adaptable for both scenarios. If policymakers
are concerned about the long-term effect of engagements, they can calculate
the credit based on the share price several years after the intervention. If, by
contrast, they wish to intensify the rate of engagements, they can select a
much shorter horizon, say of forty to sixty days.

82. Admittedly, this measure does not capture the full positive effects of active funds. It does
not reflect the broader market effects of their activities. Nonetheless, it is a useful benchmark.
83. For a review of this literature, see generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanism of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003). For some of the
classical studies on this issue, see generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) and Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978).
84. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 45, at 1130.
85. See Cremers et al., supra note 6, at 9, 11, 19, 22 n.10.
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An original solution to the short-termism versus long-termism dilemma
that can be employed in the present context is to give institutional investors
both options and let them decide.86 This approach would allow active
investors to self-select. It would also provide valuable information to the
market. The preferences of active investors reflect their estimations of future
market trends and, moreover, are indicative of their own future plans.
Institutional investors that plan to take long-term positions in firms and be
actively involved in them may choose the long-term tax credit, especially if
there is a cumulative effect to the engagements. Those that plan to make oneoff engagements would probably prefer to accept a credit that is based on
short-term performance.
Admittedly, the proposed measurement technique does not fully capture
the positive externality of the engagement. As noted above, there are two
elements that comprise the positive externalities of sophisticated investors.
The first is its positive impact on the other shareholders of the firm. The
second is its positive impact on shareholders of other firms and society at
large. The increase in share price captures only the first element. Hence, the
actual externality is greater than the estimation on which the credit is based.
Nonetheless, the change in share price provides a helpful approximation of
the added value provided by active funds. The inability to quantify
externalities accurately is an inherent problem in the deployment of
Pigouvian taxes. As William Baumol has argued in his general discussion of
this mechanism, “given the limited information at our disposal, it is perfectly
reasonable to act on the basis of a set of minimum standards of
acceptability.”87 As is true of all approximations, it is imperfect. Yet, relative
to other externalities such as industrial pollution, smoking, and traffic
congestion, that require complex models to reach even a rough assessment of
the external costs they impose, in our context, share price provides us with a
handle for estimating the externality generated by the active investors.88 The
use of changes in share prices for calculating tax credits clearly represents an
improvement over the existing state of affairs, where active funds are not
rewarded at all for their actions. In this respect, it is good to recall the words

86. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) (explaining that a menu is “a
contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than one type of contract”).
87. William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307,
318 (1972). The reason for the limited information is that the analysis of the optimal level of
Pigouvian taxes is based on the estimation of a hypothetical competitive optimum, which cannot be
estimated accurately, given our limited information regarding the production function of firms and
utility functions of individuals. Dahlman, supra note 10, at 157.
88. For multiple essays exploring examples of the complex models required for reaching a
rough assessment of the external costs in various fields, see generally THEORY AND MEASUREMENT
OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 179–259 (Steven A. Y. Lin ed., 1976).
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of wisdom attributed to both John Maynard Keynes89 and Amartya Sen,90 that
“it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.”91
A different challenge to our proposal is that changes in share prices arise
not only from the actions of active funds, but also from managerial
performance. We do not dispute the fact that managerial decisions affect firm
performance. This, however, does not affect our proposal. Active funds
invest in multiple firms. Some of them have excellent management; others
do not. This means that in some firms the positive effects of active funds are
compounded by managerial performance. In others, poor management dilutes
the positive effects of active fund involvement. In the aggregate, these effects
should offset one another. Active funds would benefit from good
management in some firms and suffer from poor management in others.
Given that active funds have large portfolios of companies, on average, the
two effects would even out. Thus, policymakers can rely on changes in share
prices as a basis for estimating tax credits for active funds.
3. Addressing Manipulability.—Even if one accepts our theoretical
framework and agrees with our analysis, she may oppose it on practical
grounds. In the real world, tax credits often generate false positives: actors
who claim to have satisfied the eligibility criteria in order to receive the
credit, although in reality they have not. The same problem can arise in our
context. Some passive funds may pass themselves off as active funds simply
by presenting themselves to the world as active funds or by adopting token
engagements that fall short of generating positive externalities. Furthermore,
active funds may collude with managements to qualify for favorable tax
treatment. This can be done by initiating interventions that the management
would not oppose. For example, active funds can propose board members
who are informally affiliated with the management, while portraying them as
independent, knowing full well that they will not be opposed. The eligibility
criteria can be manipulated in yet another way: our proposal may induce
funds to engage in excessive trading solely for the purpose of receiving tax
credits.92
89. ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 20 (2010).
90. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 24
(2002).
91. Even though this saying is commonly attributed to Keynes and Sen, it is an adaptation of a
phrase by Carveth Read. See CARVETH READ, LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE 351 (4th ed.
1920) (“It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.”).
92. In order to generate trades for the sole purpose of being classified as an active fund and
receive the tax credit, funds do not necessarily have to make any meaningful change in their
portfolio. They can constantly switch between two similar companies, e.g., United and American
Airlines, in order to receive the credit, without generating any real benefit for the investors or the
market at large. These practices are known in the corporate literature as “churning.” See, e.g.,
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It should be emphasized at the outset, that manipulability is a general
concern in the tax realm. Every tax, negative and positive, is vulnerable to
some extent to manipulation. This does not necessarily imply that the tax is
undesirable. It would have been preferable, of course, if a tax scheme were
immune to manipulation, but given all possible alternatives, taxation may still
be the most effective tool from a societal standpoint. A tax, despite its
susceptibility to manipulation, may constitute a second-best solution and
society will be better off with it than without it.
We believe that the same holds true for our proposal. While our proposal
is not manipulation proof, its susceptibility to manipulation is less significant
than that of other taxes. If the credit amount is lower than the cost of
generating the activity that qualifies funds for the credit, manipulation makes
no economic sense as it would lead to a net loss. For example, if the trading
credit enables a fund to receive a credit for a portion of the broker-costs of
generating the credit, no fund would be interested in artificially generating
trades that have no positive value in themselves: it would not increase their
profits, but only cover the costs involved. Moreover, given that our scheme
rewards efforts that exceed a certain threshold that reflects the level of
activity of passive funds, artificially increasing the frequency of trades may
prove a self-defeating strategy. A passive fund that increases its number of
trades just for the sake of receiving credit, may lose its market share to rival
passive funds. Trades that do not result in a benefit to investors imply higher
costs as long as the credit is lower than the brokerage fee. Lastly, trading
activities have tax consequences: they give rise to realization events that
generate tax liability. Thus, the risk of “empty trading,” or “churning” in an
attempt to qualify for our credit is handled by the design of the tax system.
Admittedly, our effort-based credit plan is not completely immune to
manipulation. Funds can manipulate our suggested effort-based credit by
embedding the relevant tasks that create an entitlement for the credits in the
job descriptions of senior corporate officers or other workers in the funds that
do not actually focus on monitoring investments. For example, a credit for
expenditures on financial market analytics may lead funds to include market
analysis in its CEO’s job description, and thus, pay a share of her
compensation with public money received as a tax credit. Yet such
manipulations are limited in their scope and are easy to detect and address.
The risk of false credit claims can be addressed by requiring funds to set up
Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 BUS. LAW.
571, 571 (1884) (noting that churning “occurs when a securities broker or dealer who controls the
volume and frequency of trading in a customer’s account abuses the customer’s confidence for his
own personal gain”); see also Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Churning Bubbles, 60 REV. ECON.
STUD. 813, 814 (1993) (noting portfolio managers are “churning their clients’ portfolios in the hope
of a speculative profit,” as opposed to making trades prompted by “changes in information, liquidity
shocks or risk sharing”). Our response to the challenge of manipulation of credit by trading activity
addresses trading as well. See supra subpart (II)(B).
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separate units that conduct market analysis and provide stewardship services.
These units would be manned by independent personnel to ensure that no
credit is claimed for the work of other fund employees.
It is true that relative to effort-based credits, result-based credits are
more susceptible to manipulation. For example, funds can increase the
frequency of their trades, participate in more votes, or propose a larger
number of board candidates to get credits. It should be remembered though
that such actions would increase the operation costs of funds and if they do
not lead to better results, it would adversely affect fund performance. Hence,
engaging in such measures perfunctorily may be a self-defeating strategy.
Furthermore, in the case of our suggested result-based credits, there is a tradeoff between their greater susceptibility to manipulation and their greater
alignment with actual positive externalities (compared to our effort-based
credits). Under our proposed scheme, result-based credits are reserved to
cases in which there is an actual positive externality (as opposed to effortbased credits that target potential for positive externalities, even if it does not
materialize).
Finally, lawmakers can fend off manipulation attempts by requiring
funds to satisfy the effort and outcome benchmarks we discussed. Concretely,
credit for participation in important corporate votes would only be restricted
to funds that prove adequate expenditures on analysis services. This should
screen claims by passive funds that vote in an uninformed manner.
Combining the criteria would sift out spurious claims by passive funds,
without adversely affecting active institutional investors whose business
model is tailored to the eligibility criteria.
III. The Advantages of Tax Incentives over Competing Mechanisms
In this Part, we compare our proposal to existing proposals that seek to
compel, or induce, passive funds to become more active. Our proposal has
three potential advantages over competing proposals that seek to force
passive funds to become more active. First, taxes constitute a highly effective
tool for altering behavior as they transform the underlying motivations of the
subject. Tax credits are a flexible tool that could be designed to generate
optimal incentives in complex situations. Second, our proposal has the
potential to create a virtuous financial cycle: the expected increase in tax
revenues from both the increase in investments with more frequent
realization events and the improved performance of firms generated by the
tax credits should far surpass the cost of providing the credits. Third, and
finally, from a political economy standpoint, due to its noncoercive nature,
our proposal will not attract opposition from the investment industry and thus
stands a realistic chance of being adopted.
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A.

Efficacy of Tax Incentives in Altering Behavior: Comparison to
Alternative Solutions
The potential of active funds to improve corporate governance has not
escaped the probing gaze of other scholars. Nor have they missed the fact that
passive funds have experienced dramatic growth at the expense of active
ones, in recent years. Unease with the current trend has led theorists to
propose various mechanisms for encouraging activism on the part of
institutional investors. These mechanisms range from mandating active
participation, to coordinated management arrangements, to the use of dual
class stocks to enhance engagements. In the proceeding paragraphs, we
review each of the existing proposals and explain why it is dominated by the
tax credit solution we propose.
A straightforward solution to the low participation of sophisticated
investors in corporate governance is mandatory participation.93
Unsurprisingly, this solution has been endorsed by some scholars who argued
that certain institutional investors should be required to vote in shareholder
meetings.94 Others have advanced a softer mechanism requiring institutional
investors to disclose whether or not they voted, without actually forcing them
to vote. The theory behind this measure is that forcing institutional investors
to disclose whether they voted would induce a strong motivation to exercise
their voting rights, lest they be perceived as shirking their duties.95 An
93. See Eilís Ferran, COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 248 (1999) (noting that
mandatory voting has been proposed as a solution to the “absentee landlord” problem and discussing
the merits of such a solution); Chris Mallin, Institutional Investors: The Vote as a Tool of
Governance, 16 J. MGMT. & GOV. 177, 184 (2012) (observing how institutional investors’ fear of a
mandatory voting requirement being imposed by the government contributed to a substantial uptick
in participation by those investors). For a discussion of the imposition of such a mandate on
institutional investors, see Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1359, 1367–84
(2014). For a general discussion regarding the efficacy of compulsory voting, see Note, The Case
for Compulsory Voting in the United States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591, 596–98 (2007).
94. The first to do so was the Department of Labor, which serves as the regulator of definedbenefit pension plans and has required institutional investors of defined-benefit plans to vote their
proxies. For the origination of the voting mandate, see Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy
Assistant Sec’y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin. of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl,
Chair of the Ret. Bd., Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988) (1988 WL 897696, at *2). For the
codification of this mandate, see Interpretative Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder
Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines,
29 C.F.R. § 2509.08–2 (2011), superseding 59 Fed. Reg. 32607 (June 23, 1994).
95. Margaret H. McFarland, Deputy Secretary, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Exchange
Act Release No. IA-2106, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 31, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final
/ia-2106.htm [https://perma.cc/FY76-8FCD] [hereinafter Investment Advisers Exchange Act
Release]. According to this rule discussion,
The duty of care requires an adviser with voting authority to monitor corporate actions
and vote client proxies. Therefore, the adviser should have procedures in place
designed to ensure that it fulfills these duties. We do not suggest that an adviser that
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alternative proposal has been recently suggested by Lucian Bebchuk and
Scott Hirst, who called on lawmakers to compel index funds to allocate a
certain percentage of the money they invest toward stewardship activities.96
The main drawback of all of the aforementioned measures concerns
their efficacy: it is questionable whether forcing passive funds to make
unwanted expenditures will generate effective stewardship services. As
several scholars have noted, the efficacy of such mechanisms is relatively
low.97 Forcing institutional investors to cast votes cannot in and of itself
ensure a deliberative process leading up to the vote, let alone encourage
serious monitoring on an ongoing basis. Requiring passive funds to provide
a service they are disinclined to perform when left to their own devices would
lead them to do a half-hearted job, at best, and find ways to subvert the
mandate, at worst.
A different path for leveling the playfield between passive and active
funds has been proposed by Dorothy Lund: a dual class stock structure
consisting of voting and non-voting shares.98 The existence of non-voting
shares alongside voting shares can enable efficient sorting to take place.
Active funds would purchase voting shares, while passive funds would
acquire non-voting shares, at a discounted price.99 This, in turn, would enable
active funds to monitor firms and shape their policies, while lowering the cost
of raising capital.100
Unfortunately, Lund’s proposed solution may actually exacerbate the
problem it sets out to solve. Lund’s proposal aims to decrease the power and
voice of passive funds by separating equity rights and voting rights. Passive
funds and their investors free ride on the monitoring of active investors.
Lund’s dual class stock structure intensifies the free riding problem by
increasing the gap between the costs of passive index funds and active index
funds. Passive funds will purchase non-voting shares at a discounted price,
compared to the price of the voting shares that active funds will purchase,
while the equity rights associated with both types of funds remain identical.
Our tax credit mechanism avoids these pitfalls. It is designed to induce
meaningful value-enhancing engagements. Tax incentives are a powerful
tool for altering behavior, especially when the desired form of behavior is
fails to vote every proxy would necessarily violate its fiduciary obligations. There may
even be times when refraining from voting a proxy is in the client’s best interest . . . .
....
We are requiring public disclosure as a means of informing fund shareholders how the
fund (or its adviser) voted proxies of the shareholders’ fund.
Id. (emphasis removed).
96. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 70, 2121–22.
97. Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2174–75 (1996).
98. Lund, supra note 66, at 695–96.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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complex and cannot be reduced to a simple maxim.101 This is certainly the
case in the context of enhancing activism: policymakers do not necessarily
have a precise goal to guide them. They do not necessarily want activists to
push for a certain resolution in a specific firm or reach a set level of expenses
on active monitoring of firms. In such cases, tax incentives constitute a much
more effective way of altering behavior than hard regulatory interventions.
It is noteworthy that tax incentives are especially effective when applied
to sophisticated actors, such as institutional investors. While tax incentives
can influence all actors, the calculative mode they introduce may cause them
to be less effective in the case of non-sophisticated actors.102 By contrast,
there is substantial evidence that sophisticated actors, such as corporations,
are sensitive to even the slightest tax benefits.103 Active funds are highly
calculative sophisticated actors. For this reason, they are likely to respond to
changes in the tax regime.
It should be further noted that tax credits provide a flexible policy tool.
Tax credits are non-binary and do not have to be uniform. Lawmakers can
employ tax credits in a continuous fashion, in a way that distinguishes among
different types of socially desirable activities. As we demonstrated, tax
credits can target effort or outcome and can even be used to differentiate
among various outcomes based on their social importance. More importantly,
perhaps, tax credits can be adjusted over time. If we decide that we are
approaching the socially optimal level of engagement, we can reduce the tax
credit. If, on the other hand, we believe that we have not reached the full
market effect, we can make the credit larger.

101. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17, at 2 (endorsing the view that Pigouvian taxes
dominate regulation in internalizing externalities).
102. For an example of sizeable tax incentives that have failed to alter behavior significantly,
even when it is a pure gain for taxpayers, see James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian,
$100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON & STAT. 748,
759 (2011) (pointing to the phenomenon that many individuals over the age of 64.5, who will have
a net gain from depositing funds into a 401(k) plan, do not do so). For a more general discussion on
low sensitivity to tax incentive in the context of tax credits for retirement saving, see Libson, supra
note 73, at 226–33.
103. For studies regarding the strong impact of tax incentives on corporations, see generally
Sanjay Gupta, Yuhchang Hwang & Andrew Schmidt, An Analysis of the Availability and Incentive
Effects of the R&D Tax Credit After the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (2010), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=535742; Kenneth J. Klassen, Jeffrey A. Pittman &
Margaret P. Reed, A Cross-National Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives
and Financial Constraints, 21 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 639 (2004); Michelle Hanlon & Shane
Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127, 148 (2010); Nirupama Rao, Ending
the R&D Tax Credit Stalemate, PENN. WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE ISSUE BRIEFS, Apr. 2015,
at
1,
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/34/?utm_source=repository.upenn.edu
%2Fpennwhartonppi%2F34&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages [https://perma
.cc/5L82-L7M9]; and Ming-Chin Chen & Sanjay Gupta, The Incentive Effects of R&D Tax Credits:
An Empirical Examination in an Emerging Economy, 13 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. 52, 61
(2017).
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B.

Macro-Economic Stability
Even though it may seem, at first glance, that implementation of our
proposal would impose a significant cost on the federal budget, its net
budgetary effect is likely to be neutral or positive. This is so for two reasons:
first, active funds generate much higher tax revenues than passive funds.
Taxes are paid only in instances of realization of a capital gain.104 Because
passive funds follow the buy and hold strategy, they generate far fewer
realization events than active funds. Active funds, by their very nature, trade
more frequently, and thus generate many more realization events. The
average turnover ratio for passive funds has been found to be 24%, in contrast
to that of active funds that has been found to be more than three times as
high—74%.105 Hence, active funds are subject to a higher effective tax rate
even if both types of funds have similar profits in the long run.106 For
instance, a long-term study between the years 1999 and 2014 has found that
on average active funds pay annually nearly 40% more taxes than passive
funds.107 Incentivizing investors to switch to active funds is thus likely to
increase tax revenues: the higher value of tax collected from active funds is
expected to offset and even surpass the cost of the tax credits we use to
motivate investors to switch to active funds.108
The second reason why we believe that our proposal would not have a
negative effect on the budget is that in our case the use of tax credits is
expected to create a virtuous cycle. The credits we propose are likely to
improve corporate governance across the board. They are likely to generate
market effects that extend beyond individual firms and enhance public trust
in financial markets. If implemented, they are likely to increase the
profitability of firms and correspondingly, the tax base and even tax
revenues.109
104. I.R.C. § 305 (2018).
105. Alan D. Crane & Kevin Crotty, Passive Versus Active Fund Performance: Do Index Funds
Have Skill?, 53 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 33, 39 (2018).
106. This is due to the time value of money. Even though in the aggregate passive funds
generate the same tax liability for a given gain to that of active funds, because the payment is more
frequent and sooner, in present value terms, the tax liability of active funds is higher.
107. Laura Saunders, How Passive Funds Trim Your Tax Bill, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2016,
10:26 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-passive-funds-trim-your-tax-bill-1476968401
[https://perma.cc/7LVE-P29S].
108. Regarding the higher tax liabilities from investment in active funds compared to passive
funds, see Kent Thune, How Index Funds Minimize Taxes, BALANCE (Apr. 1, 2020), https://
www.thebalance.com/how-index-funds-minimize-taxes-4019593 [https://perma.cc/86XZ-QDH5].
109. The ability of the decrease in the tax burden to fund itself in this case is distinctive from
the general ability of tax reduction to fund themselves, as expressed by the Laffer curve. The Laffer
curve focuses on conventional taxes whose main purpose is raising revenue. Laffer pointed out that
a reduction in the tax rate may increase revenues by incentivizing a higher level of economic
activity. See Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the “Laffer Curve,” PUB. INT., Winter 1978, at
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Real-world financial facts and assessments lend support to our
prediction. The financial literature estimates that agency costs in public
companies account for approximately 5% of their value.110 Enhanced active
monitoring by institutional investors will not eliminate agency costs, but
should clearly reduce them. Even on the very conservative assumption that
an enhanced level of monitoring will reduce agency costs merely by 10%,
given that the total value of public companies is $30 trillion,111 this would
represent a $160 billion increase in the total value of firms. A $1 increase in
market cap is estimated to increase tax revenues by roughly $0.40,112 which
translates to $72 billion in additional tax revenues. This means that even a
1% reduction in agency costs will generate $7.2 billion in additional taxes. A
10% reduction would mean a $72 billion increase in taxes.
C.

Overcoming Political Economy Barriers
Proposals for legal reform must be assessed through the prism of
political economy. The public choice literature teaches that strong interest
groups are likely to block reforms that harm them even if they are highly
desirable from a broad societal perspective. Accordingly, the fate of legal
reforms critically depends on the identity of the “winners” and “losers” that

3, 4 (describing the Laffer curve’s illustration of the relationship between tax rate and tax revenue).
In this case, because of the Pigouvian function of the subsidy, its impact on revenue does not arise
from incentivizing more economic activity, but rather from reducing an element of the cost that
companies incurred, increasing their net revenue. Not every Pigouvian Tax could fund itself in this
way. A Pigouvian tax subsidy may increase social welfare, but not every increase in social welfare
could be monetized easily. In our case, it can—the benefit to the companies increases their revenues
which directly translates to higher revenues from corporate taxes, capital gains taxes on
shareholders, and income taxes of workers in the company since their salaries and bonuses may
increase.
110. James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 55 J. FIN. 81, 93 tbl.1 (2000). It should be noted that their assessment is based on
companies in which the largest stockholder owns only 1%, while currently, in most public
companies the largest shareholders, mostly institutional investors, hold close to 5%. Yet as noted
earlier in the paper, the fact that the institutional investor holds a relatively large block of shares is
not effective in terms of monitoring and curbing agency problems, because of the specific agency
problem that pertains to institutional investors. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
111. Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$) - United States,
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=US [https://
perma.cc/T8H9-XVD9].
112. This figure represents the increase in revenues from corporate taxes (21%) and the increase
in revenues from capital gains (15–28% on long-term capital gains, higher for short-term, depending
on income). See 26 U.S.C. §§ 11(b), §1(h) (setting the corporate tax rate and maximum tax rate for
capital gains). It should be noted that it is not possible to infer directly how an increase in the market
cap of a firm would impact tax revenue. Market cap, of course, is not taxed directly. It is taxed only
indirectly: through the increase in future profits which are taxed via the corporate tax, through trades
of shareholders who realize their taxable capital gains, and through a tax on dividends, which are
taxed on the individual level.
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they are expected to generate, and not necessarily on their net impact on
social welfare.
Mancur Olson identified the factors that determine whether a certain
policy proposal would be adopted.113 One factor is the formation of a lobby
that supports the adoption of the proposal. Olson has underscored that the
size of the group is critical in this context, explaining that small interest
groups have a superior ability to form lobbies (relative to large groups) on
account of their lower coordination costs. In addition, policy proposals that
benefit groups that have a prior form of institutional cooperation mechanism
stand a better chance of being adopted. For example, one of the explanations
for the political influence of the NRA is that gun owners have a preexisting
institutional mechanism for facilitating cooperation in the form of common
military service, tournaments, and shooting ranges.114 An additional
determinant is the funds that a group has at its disposal—the more money it
has, the more it can spend on lobbying.
In light of Olson’s analysis, it is easy to understand why sophisticated
investors constitute such a powerful political lobby. There are merely three
actors that practically dominate the market of institutional investors:
Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock.115 While they are mainly comprised
of passive funds, they all have active funds and thus would benefit from such
a credit.116 They could easily transform their passive funds to active funds in
order to take advantage of the tax benefits we propose. Aside from the small
number of actors and the high level of concentration in the financial sector,
they also have preexisting institutional cooperation mechanisms that
facilitate the creation of a powerful lobby.
The upshot of the discussion is straightforward. Policies seeking to
coerce the investment industry to act in ways that are incompatible with their
113. OLSON, supra note 25, at 2.
114. JOSH SUGARMANN, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY, FIREPOWER & FEAR 25–42
(1992) (describing the emergence of the political power of the NRA).
115. For example, the growing ETF market is dominated by these three actors, who together
absorbed over 82.4% of the inflow to all funds in the last decade (2009–2018), and yet the pace has
increased in recent years. For example, in 2018 they have absorbed 128.6% of the inflow to all
funds. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 732
tbl.3 (2019).
116. For example, BlackRock has active funds such as Advantage Small Cap Core Fund,
Advantage Large Cap Core Fund, and Advantage International Fund. Active Equities, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/education/equities/active-equities
[https://perma.cc
/3ZKM-EFCS]. Vanguard has active funds such as Equity Income Admiral Shares, Windsor
Admiral Shares, and Explorer Admiral Shares. Vanguard Funds List: Index and Active
Mutual
Funds,
VANGUARD,
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/list?%EF%AC
%81lterIndexFunds=false&%EF%AC%81lterFiftyThousandAndUp=true#/mutual-funds/assetclass/month-end-returns [https://perma.cc/Y6Q4-ZT2T]. State Street Global Advisors have actively
managed ETFs, such as the SPDR DoubleLine Total Return ETF, SPDR SSGA Income Allocation
ETF, and SPDR SSGA Ultra Short Term Bond ETF. Fund Finder, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS,
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/fund-finder [https://perma.cc/RS4F-CT5K].
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interests stand very small chance of being adopted. Furthermore, even if such
proposals are ultimately adopted, it will happen after long and bitter battles
involving massive expenditures on both sides.117 These expenditures
constitute pure waste from a societal perspective. By contrast to most
competing proposals that rely on sticks, i.e., coercive measures, our proposal
employs a carrot and does not represent a threat to institutional investors.
Thus, it is unlikely to spark strenuous opposition on the part of the investment
industry. True, passive funds may prefer to keep things as they are right now.
But passive funds should know, too, that the current state of affairs is not
sustainable in the long run and our proposal gives them the option to become
active and claim the tax benefits, as all other active funds. This means that
passive funds would be given a choice between adhering to their present
investment strategy or taking on a more active role. So while we do not
assume that our proposal will be met with absolutely no resistance, the
opposition it would face would be much smaller than that which competing
proposals would encounter. Correspondingly, it would lead to less waste of
social resources than the alternatives.
Conclusion
Capital markets are undergoing a transformation. In September 2019,
for the first time ever, most of the shares traded in the U.S. were held by
passive funds. The increase in the market share of passive funds comes at the
expense of active funds. Passive funds lure investors away from active ones
by offering them lower management fees and also by providing low tax
liabilities accomplished by infrequent trades. To keep the fees to the bare
minimum, passive funds refrain from monitoring their portfolio companies
or engaging their management in order to ensure better performance. These
crucial tasks are avoided at all costs and left exclusively to their active peers.
Passive funds, in other words, freeride on the stewardship services and
engagements of active funds and other market participants. The diminishing
popularity of active funds raises concerns not only about the future of active
funds, but also about the quality and integrity of corporate governance in U.S.
companies. Without the monitoring services and engagements of active
funds, corporate managements would have greater liberty to pursue their own
self-interest and enrich themselves at the expense of the firm’s shareholders.
In this Essay, we explored the possibility of employing tax credits to
enhance the attractiveness of active funds and ensure their long-term
sustainability. The stewardship services that active funds perform in
combination with their participation in corporate decision-making generate
positive externalities for other shareholders and the market at large. The
standard economic solution to the presence of externalities is the institution
117. SUGARMANN, supra note 114.
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of a Pigouvian tax that would lead to the internalization of the external effect.
Since the external effect is positive in our case, it should be dealt with via the
grant of tax credits. Accordingly, we suggested that the positive externalities
created by sophisticated investors be addressed by two types of tax credits:
effort-based and result-based tax credits. We demonstrated that tax credits,
by virtue of their effectiveness and malleability, can succeed where other
measures failed and can prompt institutional investors to assume a more
active role in corporate governance. This, in turn, would produce
innumerable benefits to our economy, in general, and financial markets, in
particular.

